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1Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the eﬀect of bank competition on the cost
of lending, in an environment of reduced information asymmetries between ﬁrms
and banks. We construct a simple model linking the number of bank relationships,
the cost of lending and bank competition. Banks are exposed to more competition
if the ﬁrm has many ongoing bank relationships that improve her threat point when
negotiating borrowing costs. Moreover, increased competition in the banking sector
m i g h tm i t i g a t e( s u b s t i t u t e )o ra m p l i f y( c o m p l e m e n t )t h i se ﬀect. Using a unique
data set from Portugal, we ﬁnd that when a ﬁrm borrows from one additional
bank, the interest rate on bank loans for this ﬁr mb e c o m e s9t o2 0b a s i sp o i n t s
l o w e ro na v e r a g e .I na d d i t i o n ,w eﬁnd that when local bank competition is more
intense ﬁrms can beneﬁt more from simultaneously engaging in several banking
relationships, hence providing evidence of complementarity between competition
and the number of bank relationships. However, we do not observe these eﬀects
for the smallest and youngest ﬁrms.
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21 Introduction
Information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders play a crucial role in the bank-
ing literature. However, the existence of information sharing mechanisms may have
important implications in reducing the asymmetric information problem in a borrower-
lender relationship.1 This paper studies a credit market with a public mandatory credit
registry designed to facilitate information sharing. We ﬁrst investigate the inﬂuence of
the number of banks that a ﬁrm borrows from on the cost of loans in this environment.
Then we focus our analysis on the indirect eﬀect of credit market competition on the
interaction between the number of bank relationships2 and interest rates.
We explore an alternative framework to the classic asymmetric information model to
explain the nexus between the number of bank relationships, competition and the cost of
loans. To organize our thoughts, we construct a model in which a ﬁrm’s cost of borrowing
is the outcome of a negotiation between the ﬁrm manager and the banker. In our setup,
the number of ongoing bank relationships the ﬁr mh a sp l a y st h er o l eo fa no u t s i d e
option of funding and favorably aﬀects the position of the manager in the negotiation.
An increase in the number of bank relationships decreases the cost of loans. The model
also shows that a change in the degree of bank competition can improve or lessen the
impact of the number of bank relationships. The latter outcome will depend on the
degree of complementarity between the number of bank relationships and the tightness
of the credit market. On one hand, when there are more banks in the market it might
be easier to switch banks even without maintaining ongoing bank relationships. On the
other hand, in a more competitive market the threat to switch to another bank becomes
1See for instance Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009) and Brown and Zehnder (2007).
2In this study, the number bank of relationships corresponds to the number of banks a ﬁrm borrows
from.
3more credible. In the former case, the tightness of the credit market and the number of
bank relationships are substitutes, while in the latter case they are complements. In the
remainder of the paper we provide empirical evidence for the predictions of the model
using Portuguese data.
The Portuguese banking sector provides an excellent laboratory for such an exercise.
First, in Portugal, like in some other countries (for example, France, Spain and Italy), the
Central Credit Register allows ﬁnancial institutions to share crucial information about
their customers. This information sharing mechanism is designed to reduce ex-ante in-
formation asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. The Portuguese Central Credit
Register provides a comprehensive panel dataset that includes loan information on all
loans above 50 euros. It contains ﬁrm level data on the total debt to credit institutions,
t h ea m o u n to fd e b to v e r d u ea n dt h er e p a y m e n tr e c o r do ft h eﬁrm, regardless of the ﬁrm
size. Second, Portugal has historically been a bank-based economy. Most external fund-
ing of non-ﬁnancial corporations is provided by banks, with only a very small percentage
of the economy raising capital in public markets.3 Third, during the past decade, which
coincides with our dataset, the Portuguese banking sector has experienced remarkable
changes due to entries, mergers and acquisitions, providing suﬃcient variation in credit
market conditions for our empirical analysis.
Our ﬁrst observation is that on average a Portuguese ﬁrm borrows from three banks,
which is a relatively high number of relationships by international standards, but typical
among countries with the French law system, as reported for instance by Ongena and
3Bank loans represent almost 60 per cent of Portuguese ﬁrms external funding, whereas trade credit
represents almost 20 per cent, as shown in Antão and Bonﬁm (2009).
4Smith (2000). Large ﬁrms typically borrow from six banks or more, while the smallest
ﬁrms in the economy borrow from two banks on average.4
We obtain several interesting results. First, the ﬁrm’s interest rate on bank loans
falls as the ﬁrm borrows from more banks, controlling for relevant ﬁrm characteristics.
When a ﬁr mb o r r o w sf r o mo n ea d d i t i o n a lb a n k ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t eo nb a n kl o a n sf o rt h i s
ﬁrm becomes 9 to 20 basis points (bps) lower, on average. This pattern holds for all
ﬁrms except for micro and young ﬁr m s ,f o rw h i c ht h ei m p a c to ft h en u m b e ro fb a n k s
on the cost of loans is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is similar
to what is estimated for Italy, another country with a public mandatory credit register,
where the cost of bank loans is reduced by 1 to 13 bps per additional relationship (e.g
Conigliani, Ferri, and Generale (1997), D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (1999), Ferri and
Messori (2000)). These results are diﬀerent from those found in the U.S., where the cost
of bank loans typically increases with the number of bank relationships (e.g. Petersen
and Rajan (1994) and Hao (2003)).5
Second, we ﬁnd that the negative relationship between the number of banks and the
cost of loans is ampliﬁed by the degree of local market concentration. The eﬀect of
the number of bank relationships on bank interest rates is stronger in areas with more
intense local bank competition. Again, this pattern holds for all ﬁr m se x c e p tf o rm i c r o
and young ﬁrms. The results for the micro and young ﬁrms suggest they do not beneﬁt
from diversifying their pool of lenders in terms of borrowing costs, possibly because of
persisting information opaqueness despite the existence of the credit registry.
4The deﬁnition of ﬁrm size is based on the European Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003.
Micro ﬁrms are deﬁned as those with fewer than 10 employees and less than 2 million euros of sales
volume. Small ﬁrms are those with fewer than 50 employees and less than 10 million euros of sales
volume. Medium ﬁrms are those with fewer than 250 employees and less than 50 million euros of sales
volume. All remaining ﬁrms are considered to be large ﬁrms.
5However, in Spain, Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano (2006) observe a positive relationship
between the number of lending banks and interest rates.
5This paper is related to various strands of literature. First there are many studies
that discuss the incentives to keep multiple bank relationships.6 Second, and closer to
the focus of this paper, there is an ongoing debate regarding the inﬂuence of the number
of bank relationships on the cost of borrowing. On one hand, Diamond’s (1984) classical
delegated monitoring theory argues that exclusive lending relationships minimize loan
rates by avoiding duplication of monitoring costs. On the other hand, other authors
predict that ﬁrms can reduce interest rates by borrowing from several banks. For exam-
ple, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) hypothesize that in an exclusive bank relationship
the informationally privileged bank might exploit its bargaining power over the ﬁrm and
extract rents from loan contracts. This implies that micro and small ﬁrms having only a
single lender should pay a higher cost of borrowing. More recently, Degryse and Ongena
(2008) survey empirical ﬁndings from diﬀerent countries and report that both the mag-
nitude and the direction of the eﬀect of the number of banks on interest rates change
across countries.
Finally, our paper is also related to the strand of literature on the eﬀect of credit
market competition on lending relationships and borrowing costs. For example, Petersen
and Rajan (1995) suggest that for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms it is cheaper and easier
to borrow from banks in a less competitive credit market. When banks can break even
6In addition to those who argue that multiple bank relationships may result in lower funding costs
(e.g. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)), Berger and Udell (1998) argue that the refusal of credit from the
ﬁrm’s only lender may send a negative signal to the market, thus making the exclusive bank relationship
undesirable. Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) show that this is especially true in economies with
high bankruptcy costs and less fragile banking sectors. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) consider that
multiple bank relationships might prevent the ﬁrm manager from strategic defaulting by holding up
the renegotiation process. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Carletti,
Cerasi, and Daltung (2007) predict that multiple bank relationships will occur when banks face ﬁnancial
constraints or monitoring costs. Carletti et al. (2007) also suggest that multiple bank relationships
allow banks to diversify their lending risk. They predict that banks are more attracted to multiple-bank
lending when the bank has lower equity, when the cost of monitoring is high, and when the proﬁtability
of the ﬁrm is low. Finally, in a recent paper, Ioannidou and Ongena (2008) show that when ﬁrms change
banks they beneﬁt initially from lower interest rates. However, as time goes by, hold-up eﬀects gradually
emerge.
6intertemporally, they are able to charge lower rates up-front, anticipating higher returns
in the future when information asymmetry dissolves. However, market competition forces
banks to break even in every period and, as a result, relationship banking becomes less
feasible, leading to high interest rates and limited access to credit for ﬁnancially distressed
(young and low quality) ﬁrms. On the contrary, Boot and Thakor (2000) posit that low
quality ﬁrms will always rely on relationship intensive lending, while higher quality ﬁrms
can borrow at lower costs through transaction-based lending. When competition in
credit markets is more intense, relationship lending becomes more important to banks,
as they are able to extract rents from these relationships, shielding themselves from price
competition. In our setting, a change in the degree of competition can improve or lessen
the impact of relationship lending on the cost of loans, thus including the predictions of
both Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Boot and Thakor (2000). Empirically we ﬁnd that
the interaction between market competition and the number of bank relationships lowers
signiﬁcantly the cost of loans across all ﬁrm sizes, except for micro and young ﬁrms. Our
ﬁndings do not support (but do not reject) the hypothesis presented by Petersen and
Rajan (1995), since we do not observe the predicted positive linkage between competition
and interest rates for the smallest and youngest ﬁrms in our sample. Our results can
be consistent with the predictions of Boot and Thakor (2000). These authors argue
that micro and young ﬁrms who are more likely to be engaged in relationship banking
beneﬁt less from price competition, and that large and mature ﬁrms are more likely to
use transaction-based multiple lending in competitive markets.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a model of bank relationships
and bank competition. In Section 3 we describe the datasets used and present some
relevant summary statistics, and in Section 4 we discuss the results obtained in a re-
7gression analysis framework, evaluating how the number of bank relationships inﬂuences
borrowing costs. In Section 5 we test how bank competition aﬀects the impact of the
choice of the number of bank relationships on loan interest rates. In Section 6 we present
the results of some robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our main ﬁndings.
2T h e m o d e l
Our model formally abstracts from the conventional asymmetric information environ-
ment that is widely used to characterize relationship banking and focuses on a matching-
bargaining framework. We think of the cost of a loan for a ﬁrm as the outcome of a
negotiation between the ﬁrm manager and the banker. Our modeling choice is motivated
by the existence of the Central Credit Register that is designed to reduce information
asymmetries between ﬁnancial institutions and borrowers. In our setup, the stock of ex-
isting bank relationships a ﬁrm has favorably aﬀects the position of the ﬁrm during the
negotiation. Furthermore, at a more systemic level, banking deregulation reduces rents
and changes the contractual power of players. Banking sector deregulation therefore af-
fects not only the position of ﬁrms at the bargaining table, but also the market outcome
in terms of economic eﬃciency. To study these issues we build a model based on two
central assumptions: a frictional credit market, which determines the size of rents; and a
bargaining mechanism to determine the price of funding or how the rents are distributed
between the ﬁr m sa n dt h eb a n k s .
T h ef r i c t i o n a lc r e d i tm a r k e ti sc o m p o s e do ft w oe l e m e n t s 7.T h e ﬁrst is a search
environment to make the contact between ﬁrms and banks non-trivial. The second is
imperfect competition in the banking sector. To model the contact between a ﬁrm and
7This friction could also be interpreted as the non-modeled asymmetric information costs.
8a bank we follow a standard search model8. We focus on the steady state solution. The
speciﬁc so ft h em o d e la r ea sf o l l o w s .
Time is inﬁnite and discrete. There are m ﬁrms indexed by i and nb banks indexed
by j.A ﬁrm i wants to borrow Ii from a bank j to initiate a project that has a ﬂow
return of zi. Once the ﬁrm ﬁnds one bank, the ﬁrm value function of accepting a deal















where zi is the per period cash ﬂow from the investment, rL
i,j the interest rate on the
loan, β ad i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,σi the probability of default, and JD
i the value of default. We
have omitted time subscripts, and a prime denotes next period. For simplicity, we do
not explicitly model default and simply assume an exogenous value of default for each
ﬁrm JD
i . If the two parties do not reach an agreement on the price of the loan, the value













where ci is the cost per period of postponing, JA
i is the expected value ofJA
i,j and f(θ,nr
i)
is the probability of ﬁnding a bank in the next period to negotiate a deal, which depends
positively on an aggregate measure of credit market tightness θ and on nr
i,t h en u m b e r
of relationships the ﬁrm has with diﬀerent banks. The probability of ﬁn d i n gab a n k
f(θ,nr
i), or more appropriately the contact rate between a ﬁrm and a bank, corresponds
to the search friction, which plays a central role in the model.
8See Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
9The probability of ﬁn d i n gab a n k ,f(θ,nr
i), is derived through a matching function,
M, that determines the number of contacts between ﬁrms and banks as a function of
the number of ﬁrms, m, and the number of banks, nb,a sw e l la st h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro f




For simplicity, assume that M is homogenous of degree one in nb and nrm.T h ec o n t a c t
rate for a ﬁrm having nr
i bank relationships is f(θ,nr
i) ≡ nr
iM(θ,1),w h e r eθ = nb
nrm,t h u s
representing the tightness of the banking sector.9
To model imperfect competition10 we use the classic model of Salop (1979) in his
banking version (see Freixas and Rochet (1997)). The model of the banking sector is
then as follows. The nb banks are equally spaced around a circle of size m.11 The location
of a ﬁrm on the circle is randomly assigned at the beginning of each period. There is a
cost τ proportional to the distance between one ﬁrm and the closest bank. If the ﬁrm
has an existing relationship with one bank, the cost to go to that bank is equal to the
cost of reaching the closest non-relationship bank. Firms have to borrow to ﬁnance their
investment Ii and banks charge an interest rate rL. Banks borrow from an inﬁnitely
elastic supply of deposits oﬀered by the depositors at a cost r<r L, so that the proﬁts
9We assume that 0 <f<1. It should be noted that m is exogenous in this model.
10The mere presence of search frictions introduces quasi-rents in the credit market. However, we
prefer to explicitly add an imperfect competition environment in the banking sector.
11We assume that the size of the circle is equal to the mass of ﬁrms.
















Ii + β(1 − σi)Π
b0
i,j.
When the ﬁrm meets a bank, they bargain over the cost of the loan. We assume ﬁrms















where α is the bargaining power of the bank and for simplicity is the same across banks.
Solving the bargaining game and considering that every neighboring bank will oﬀer the
same interest rate to ﬁrm i,w eﬁnd that the cost of the loan rL






















The ﬁrst term inside the parenthesis, m
nb, corresponds to the markup due to the imperfect
competition environment. The second term can be interpreted as an adjustment to the
markup due to the bargaining game: part of the rent goes to the ﬁrm as long as she
has some bargaining power (α<1). We are now able to solve for the steady state
12I nt h ec r e d i tm a r k e tt h ei n d i ﬀerence condition for a ﬁrm i at a distance x ∈ [0,m/n b] from bank j
to borrow from bank j or bank j − 1 is:
τx+ rL
i,jIi = τ(m/nb − x)+rL
i,j−1Ii













11equilibrium and ﬁnd the eﬀects of an increase in the number of bank relationships on





Proposition 1 An increase in the number of bank relationships decreases the cost of the





The proposition follows from simple algebra. The intuition is also straightforward:
by having a greater number of bank relationships, the ﬁrm improves the value of its
outside option13 in the bargaining game and obtains a lower cost of funding. This simple
reasoning provides an alternative channel to explain the linkage between the number of
bank relationships and the cost of loans.
Credit market conditions might also aﬀe c tt h eo u t s i d eo p t i o n so fﬁrms. To study the




where κ i se n t r yc o s t sp e rb a n k .F o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fﬁrms m, the free-entry condition
gives the number of banks nb. A decrease in κ increases the number of banks and lowers
their market power (the ﬁr s tt e r mi nt h ep a r e n t h e s i si n1 )w i t haf a v o r a b l ee ﬀect on the
cost of funding for the ﬁrm. Furthermore the lower rent decreases the share of the ﬁrm in
splitting the surplus (the second term in the parenthesis in 1), potentially counteracting
the eﬀect of the decrease in the markup on the interest rate. In our setup there is also
an indirect eﬀect that comes from the matching function: an increase in the number
of banks increases the contact rate and therefore the outside option of the ﬁrm, adding
13More precisely, its threat point changes.
12another channel through which the increased competition lowers the interest rate. These
arguments lead to our next proposition.
Proposition 2 Ad e c r e a s ei nκ, namely an increase in competition in the banking sector,
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the cost of loans rL
i,j.
An interesting point is the degree of complementarity between the credit market
tightness θ and the number of bank relationships nr
i.W h e nθ and nr
i are complements,
an increase in the number of banks improves the eﬀect of nr
i on f(θ,nr
i),a n dw h e nθ and
nr
i are substitutes the eﬀect is the opposite. An interpretation of the complementarity
c o u l db ea sf o l l o w s :o no n eh a n d ,w h e nt h e r ea r em o r eb a n k si nt h em a r k e ti tm i g h t
be easier to switch banks even without maintaining ongoing bank relationships; on the
other hand, in a more competitive market the threat to switch to another ongoing bank
relationship becomes more credible. In the former case the tightness of the credit mar-
ket and the number of bank relationships are substitutes while in the latter case they
are complements. Clearly this is an empirical question and we shall address it in our
regressions. We summarize this argument in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Ad e c r e a s ei nκ, namely an increase in competition in the banking sector,
can increase or reduce the eﬀect of the ongoing number of bank relationships, nr,o nt h e
cost of loans rL
i,j.
T h ef a c tt h a tf(θ,nr
i) depends directly on individual ﬁrm characteristics suggests
the idea that ﬁrms choose optimally the number of relationships nr
i.T h eﬁrm manager
understands that the ﬁrm can use its outside option to improve its bargaining position
and that the ﬁrm can alter the bargaining terms when it goes to a bank for a loan. It is
possible to endogenize nr
i in the model: in each period the ﬁrm can determine the desired
13number of banks. The optimal choice of nr
i is presented in the appendix, together with
the derivation of our main empirical equation. In deriving the optimal choice of nr
i,w e
assume a reasonable timing for the ﬁrm’s actions, namely that interest payments are
subsequent to initiating the relationship contract with the bank. This assumption allows
us to abstract from simultaneity problems coming from nr
i in the empirical exercises.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to test the previous three propositions.
3 Data and summary statistics
Two large datasets are used in this work. All information concerning the number of
bank relationships comes from the Central Credit Register of Banco de Portugal.T h i s
extensive database includes information on all credit exposures above 50 euros, reported
monthly by all Portuguese credit institutions. The reporting is mandatory. The main
objective of this database is to disseminate information among participating institutions
in order to improve their credit risk assessment on current and potential borrowers.
Participating banks can observe, for each borrower, the number of bank relationships
this borrower has, the total outstanding debt, as well as the status of the loans 14.T h i s
database does not include any information regarding loan maturity, collateral or interest
rates. We obtain information on the cost of borrowing from another large dataset: the
Central Balance Sheet Database of Banco de Portugal.T h i sd a t a b a s ep r o v i d e sd e t a i l e d
yearly accounting information, including ﬁrm age, economic sector, proﬁtability, leverage,
etc., for a large sample of Portuguese ﬁrms. Reporting to the Central Balance Sheet
Database was not compulsory during the sample period and, as a consequence, this
14It is also possible to know whether credit has become overdue, if it was renegotiated or if it is an
oﬀ-balance sheet risk, such as the unused part of a credit line or a bank guarantee.
14database covers only a limited (but large) sample of Portuguese ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the
sample is considered to be representative, though its representativeness may be somewhat
poorer for smaller ﬁrms.
Using end of year data for the period comprised between 1996 and 2004, the Central
Credit Register includes 3,990,802 records15.T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n td a t af o rt h es a m ep e -
riod of time, the Central Balance Sheet Database includes 202,364 records. Merging the
two databases, we obtain 154,682 common observations, comprising 38,342 ﬁrms. Even
though both databases were created before 1996, the interest payments on bank loans of
the Central Balance Sheet Database are available only from 1996 onward, constraining
our sample to start in 1996.
In our study, we analyze only lending relationships between ﬁrms and banks, ex-
cluding all lending relationships with non-monetary credit institutions, such as leasing
companies16.








15Banks do not report information on a strict loan-by-loan basis, given that it is possible to aggregate
loans granted to the same ﬁrm with similar status. We aggregate loans by ﬁrm, in order to count the
number of bank relationships. Hence, each record is deﬁned as a ﬁrm-year pair.
16Non-monetary credit institutions are usually small and specialized credit institutions (sometimes
belonging to large universal banking groups), which do not oﬀer checking accounts. Hence, even though
these non-bank credit institutions can hold long-term relationships with the ﬁrms they grant credit to,
they will hardly be able to establish exclusive relationships with ﬁrms, given that they can oﬀer them
only a limited set of ﬁnancial services. Moreover, the pricing of debt granted by these institutions may
be supported by standards very diﬀerent from those applied by banking institutions, which can beneﬁt
from the monitoring of ﬂows and balances of ﬁrms’ deposits, as discussed by Mester, Nakamura and
Renault (2006).
15where IPit is the interest payments on bank loans and Dit total debt to credit institutions
of ﬁrm i.17 rL
it is therefore the average interest rate of ﬁrm i at time t across all of the
ﬁrm’s bank loans18.O u r ﬁnal dataset is an unbalanced panel data containing 42,263
observations, for 17,516 ﬁrms, between 1996 and 2004. Each ﬁrm has on average 2.4
years of data19.
Figure 1 shows the average, median, and weighted mean of our measure of interest rate
against the aggregate interest rate on all outstanding loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations
in Portugal disclosed by Banco de Portugal. The weighted average of the interest rate
appears to track the aggregate interest rate rather well. The decreasing interest rate
during the 1990s reﬂects the convergence and integration in the European Monetary
Union and probably also changes in bank competition during the sample period20.
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows a histogram of the bank interest rate over the
entire sample. In the lower panel of Figure 2 we present the histograms of the interest
rate for each year in our sample. The distribution of interest rates across ﬁrms changed
signiﬁcantly between 1996 and 2004. Whereas in the earlier years of the sample period
interest rates showed an almost uniform distribution, exhibiting a large dispersion in
borrowing costs across ﬁrms; in the latter years of the sample period the distribution
became closer to a log-normal. In these latter years, there was not only a decrease in
average interest rates paid by ﬁrms, but also a substantial decline in their dispersion.
17We considered diﬀerent implicit interest rates deﬁnitions using the ﬁrms’ balance sheet information,
for instance using the average amount of debt in two years or the total amount of interest paid. We
performed several checks to evaluate the reliability of our interest rate measures.
18We have truncated the right and left hand tails of the distribution of rL
it, and provide a detailed
description of our ﬁlters in the data appendix.
19Firm’s entries and exits from the sample are not strictly associated with ﬁrm’s creations and ex-
tinctions. They reﬂect primarily the voluntary nature of the survey sent to ﬁrms.
20An analysis of competition in the Portuguese banking market in this period may be found in
Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009).
16We now turn to some preliminary analysis on the linkage between the cost of debt
and the number of bank relationships. Approximately one quarter (26 per cent) of the
ﬁrms hold one exclusive lending relationship. Across time there was a signiﬁcant drop
in the percentage of ﬁrms with unique relationships: from almost 30 per cent in 1996
to nearly 20 per cent in 2004. The average number of bank relationships did not vary
signiﬁcantly over time, ranging between 2.8 and 3.3 across the sample period.
Figure 3 shows that the number of lending relationships increases steadily with the
ﬁrm age. Start-up ﬁrms have, on average, two or three lending relationships, whereas
older ﬁrms hold a more diversiﬁed creditor structure. Furthermore, younger ﬁrms pay
higher interest rates than do older ﬁrms, as expected21.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the number of bank relationships together with
the interest rate and proxies for ﬁrm size and maturity such as the number of employees
and ﬁrm age22. Columns 2 and 3 show that ﬁrms with a single banking relationship pay
a higher interest rate than ﬁrms with two or three relationships. Columns 4 to 7 show
that the number of bank relationships is positively related to ﬁrm age and to the number
of employees.
We construct a measure of ﬁrm size following a deﬁnition suggested by the European
Commission that uses the number of employees and sales volumes and that results in four
diﬀerent size categories: micro, small, medium and large23. We end up with 12,417 micro,
18,703 small, 8,918 medium and 2,225 large ﬁrms. Table 2 displays the number of bank
relationships and the interest rate for these four categories. Micro and small ﬁrms hold
respectively, on average, two and three bank relationships, medium-sized ﬁrms borrow
21Farinha and Santos (2002), who also investigated the number of bank relationships in Portugal,
observe that almost all ﬁrms start borrowing only from a single bank, but soon afterward diversify their
creditor structure, most notably when growth opportunities are stronger.
22To ease the reading of the table we exclude the ﬁrms with more than 15 relationships.
23See footnote 4.
17from more than four banks, while larger ﬁrms have six diﬀerent bank relationships. Table
2 also shows that the interest rate decreases with the ﬁrm size.
To conclude our descriptive analysis, we perform mean comparison tests to evaluate
if interest rates are statistically diﬀerent for ﬁrms with many relationships (above the
4th quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships) and for ﬁrms with few
relationships (below the 1st quartile of the same distribution). As shown in Table 2,
interest rates paid by these two groups of ﬁrms are indeed diﬀerent. Firms with fewer
relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates. We also performed these tests for
the four size categories. For both micro and small ﬁrms, interest rates are statistically
higher for ﬁrms with fewer relationships. For medium-sized ﬁrms, the mean comparison
tests suggest that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in interest rates for ﬁrms in the 1st
and 4th quartiles of the distribution of the number of relationships. Finally, for large
ﬁrms, interest rates are signiﬁcantly higher with many bank relations.
4 The number of bank relationships and borrowing
costs
The descriptive analysis performed above suggests that ﬁrms that have one or few lending
relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates, especially if they are smaller ﬁrms. In
this section, we perform a regression analysis and control for several ﬁrm characteristics
that may inﬂuence interest paid on bank loans and have been extensively used in related
studies. For instance, it is reasonable to consider that proﬁtability (in our model this
w o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt ozi), collateral, leverage or the ﬁrm’s credit risk (σi)a r et a k e ni n t o
account by banks when pricing loans. We deﬁne Turnover as sales and services as a
18percentage of the ﬁrm’s assets. Firms with more turnover are able to generate larger
cash-ﬂows with their activity and may face lower funding costs. Next we deﬁne Tangible
assets as % of debt to proxy for collateral. Leverage is deﬁned as debt over assets to
control for the inﬂuence of the outstanding debt on the interest rate. Credit risk is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one whenever the ﬁrm is in default at the end
of the year. Debt coverage,c a l c u l a t e da sn e tp r o ﬁts over debt to credit institutions,
is another measure of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health. We also include size measured by
Assets and the Age of the ﬁrm, the latter measured as the number of years since a
ﬁrm’s inception24. In the regressions, all ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are lagged by one year,
motivated by the fact that banks can only observe the previous year balance sheet when
negotiating the loan and for obvious endogeneity problems. Table 3 reports summary
statistics for the dependent and independent variables25.
The sample period corresponds to a time of structural change in the Portuguese
banking sector as well as to the period of convergence that led to the European Monetary
Union accession. These developments contributed to the steady downward trend seen
in money market interest rates during this period. At the same time the Portuguese
economy went through a full business cycle. To capture all these time eﬀects we include
in the regressions a set of time dummies and, in a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, the 3-month
Euribor, the total number of banks granting credit in each year, nb,a n dG D Pg r o w t h .
We estimate the following ﬁxed-eﬀects model:
r
L
it = αi + δn
r
it + βXit + ϕXit−1 + γZt + uit
24Age deﬁned as log(1 + age).
25In the data appendix we include the correlation matrix of the regressors.
19where rL
it is the interest rate, nr
it is the number of bank relationships, Xit and Xit−1
are vectors of contemporaneous and lagged ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, and Zt is a vector of
time-varying variables26.
In Table 4 we present our ﬁrst set of econometric results. We begin by regressing
the interest rate on the number of bank relationships and time dummies with ﬁrm ﬁxed-
eﬀects. The results are shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 4. The coeﬃcient on Number
of bank relationships is -0.142 with a t-statistic of -5.51. On average one additional
bank relationship decreases the interest rate by 14 bps. This result is consistent with
Proposition 1 and also with the predictions of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), for
instance.
In column 2 we control for the ﬁrm characteristics, including Turnover, Tangible
assets as % of debt, Leverage, Credit risk, Debt coverage, Firm age, Assets and (Assets)2.
The number of observations drops by approximately half due to the inclusion of the
lagged variables. All coeﬃcients show up with the expected sign when statistically
signiﬁcant. Turnover, Tangible assets as % of debt and Assets reduce interest rates,
while Credit risk has the opposite eﬀect. The coeﬃcients on Leverage, Debt coverage and
Age are not statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level. The coeﬃcient of (Assets)2 is positive,
thus implying a convex eﬀect of ﬁrm size on interest rates. The coeﬃcient of the Number
of bank relationships is similar to the previous regression without the ﬁrm controls: one
additional relationship should decrease interest rates by 11 bps. The time dummies
are highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that it is important to control for macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial developments.
26In order to avoid results driven by outliers we exclude from the regressions all observations below
the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile of the distribution of each ﬁrm speciﬁcv a r i a b l e .
20In column 3, we include macroeconomic variables instead of the time dummies: the
3-month Euribor, the total number of banks granting credit in each year and GDP growth.
The coeﬃcient of the 3-month Euribor is signiﬁcant and positive as expected. We control
for the total number of banks because there were entries, exits, mergers, and acquisitions
in the banking sector during this period. The number of banks can also serve as a proxy
for the overall competition level in the credit market. The coeﬃcient of the total number
of banks is negative and signiﬁcant. Finally GDP growth is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient of the number of bank relationships decreases slightly in this speciﬁcation
to 9 bps.
In order to better explore diﬀerences across ﬁrm size, we repeat the regression in
column 2 for each size category. We ﬁnd that the Number of bank relationships decreases
the cost of debt for all ﬁrm sizes, with the exception of micro ﬁrms, for which the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.27. The largest statistically signiﬁcant
slope coeﬃcient is obtained for large ﬁrms: an additional bank relationship reduces
the interest rate on average by 21 bps for large ﬁrms and by 15 and 12 bps for small
and medium ﬁrms, respectively. The diﬀerences in economic and statistical signiﬁcance
across ﬁrm sizes are consistent with the argument that larger ﬁrms have a stronger threat
point28.
We also estimated these regressions for diﬀerent economic sectors.29 The results
are very signiﬁcant for the construction sector: one additional relationship reduces the
interest rate by 28 bps, on average. The eﬀect of the number of bank relationships
27In fact, most regressors are not signiﬁcant in explaining interest rates for micro ﬁrms. This may
reﬂect some discrecionarity in loan pricing behavior for the smaller ﬁrms, as discussed by Cerqueiro,
Degryse and Ongena (2007).
28The argument is also consistent with the more traditional asymmetric information story used in
the relationship banking literature, which aﬃrms that concentrated lending relationships are crucial to
informationally opaque (small and young) ﬁrms, while they are of less importance to large ﬁrms.
29The results are not reported in the tables, but are available upon request.
21on bank interest rates is not as large for manufacturing and trade ﬁrms and it is not
statistically signiﬁcant for agriculture, real estate or transport ﬁrms.
Firm age f a i l st ob es i g n i ﬁcant in the regressions estimated, even though the descrip-
tive analysis presented in the previous section seemed to give support to the existence of
an age eﬀect in interest rates30. To further explore if ﬁrm age aﬀects the linkage between
the number of bank relationships and interest rates, we estimate the same regression for
two diﬀerent age groups: younger ﬁrms that have an age lower than the median age in
our sample (14 years), and more mature ﬁr m st h a ta r ea b o v et h em e d i a na g e .T h er e s u l t s
are displayed in the last two columns of Table 4. On average one additional relationship
for older ﬁrms signiﬁcantly decreases interest rates by 13 bps. Older ﬁrms, which have on
average a large number of bank relationships, beneﬁt from the diversiﬁcation in lending
sources. For younger ﬁrms, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.31
To summarize, we ﬁn ds t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a tt h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a tb a n k sc h a r g ei ss i g -
niﬁcantly and negatively related to the number of bank relationships, which is consistent
with the ﬁrst proposition of our model.
5 The role of bank competition
Our model predicts that market competition might aﬀect how the number of bank re-
lationships inﬂuences the cost of loans. According to our speciﬁcation of the matching
function M, the number of banks in the market, nb,d i r e c t l ya ﬀects the contact rate be-
tween ﬁrms and banks. In turn, the number of banks is aﬀected by entry costs and other
30This age eﬀect is documented by Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2007), who ﬁnd that young ﬁrms
beneﬁt initially from lower interest rates, as banks compete to attract them. Once they are locked-in,
markups on interest rates increase. However, as ﬁrms get older and information asymmetries become
less severe, interest rate markups decrease again.
31For robustness purposes, we tested a diﬀerent age threshold, distinguishing ﬁrms with more or less
than 10 years. The results are consistent with those presented above.
22market conditions and reﬂects the overall level of bank competition. A larger number
of banks in the economy increases the probability of ﬁnding a bank and hence has an
eﬀect similar to that of the number of existing bank relationships of a ﬁrm. Furthermore,
depending on the degree of complementarity between credit market tightness (θ in the
model) and the number of existing bank relationships, nr
i, a change in bank competition
can either weaken or strengthen the eﬀects of nr
i on the interest rate, rL
i .
In this section, we address this issue empirically, examining the extent to which
bank competition inﬂuences the impact of the number of bank relationships on interest
rates. As discussed in the introduction, there is a debate in the literature regarding
the interaction of these variables. On one hand, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that
bank competition should lead to lower interest rates oﬀered by arms-length lending and
give banks incentives to focus more on relationship lending. In their model, relationship
lending and arms-length can coexist in competitive credit markets, with the latter oﬀering
lower interest rates. On the other hand, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that, for credit
constrained ﬁrms, market competition leads to higher interest rates, as banks may be
forced to break even in every period.
Local bank competition measures may be more relevant than aggregate measures for
our analysis. If a ﬁrm operates in a small town, there will be only a limited number of
banks the ﬁrm can borrow from, whereas in a large urban area there will be many banks
c o m p e t i n gt oo ﬀer loans to ﬁrms. Hence, diﬀerences in local bank competition may also
be an important source of endogeneity if omitted, given that they may simultaneously
inﬂuence the choice of the number of bank relationships (due to availability constraints)
and the interest rate paid by ﬁrms (due to diﬀerences in competition intensity). De-
gryse and Ongena (2005) evaluate empirically the link between lending relationships,
23distance, and competition and obtain evidence that supports the hypothesis of spatial
price discrimination in bank lending32.
We construct a measure of local bank competition using the Herﬁndahl index at each
district33, taking into account banks granting credit to micro, small, and medium ﬁrms.
We exclude loans granted to large ﬁrms from this deﬁn i t i o nb e c a u s ew ec o n s i d e rt h a t
these ﬁrms may easily obtain funding outside their district.
We distinguish between ﬁrms operating in districts with more or less intense local
bank competition. We deﬁne three dummy variables: Lower local bank competition (ﬁrst
quartile of the distribution of the Herﬁndahl index), Medium local bank competition
(second and third quartiles) and Higher local bank competition (fourth quartile). We
take the Medium local bank competition as default and omit it from the regression.
We ﬁr s tt e s tt h ed i r e c te ﬀect of local bank competition on the cost of loans, in order to
shed some light on Proposition 2. The results are shown in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns of Table
5. The coeﬃcients estimated on the competition dummies are marginally signiﬁcant for
small and large ﬁrms in the most competitive markets (small and large ﬁrms in districts
with more intense local bank competition beneﬁt from lower interest rates).
Second, we investigate the indirect eﬀect of local bank competition by interacting
the number of bank relationships with the intensity of local bank competition, in or-
der to empirically test Proposition 3.34 This is the eﬀect that should come through a
change in the outside option of the ﬁrm and indicate if bank market tightness and the
32Degryse and Ongena (2005) deﬁne the main local competitor as the bank branch with the 25th
percentile traveling time in the same postal code as the borrower.
33A district is an administrative territorial unit and is matched with ﬁrms according to the location
of ﬁrms’ headquarters. There are 18 districts in Portugal.
34Montoriol-Garriga (2005) also runs a similar regression, but interacts a dummy variable (one versus
multiple bank-relationships) with a measure of bank competition. The author ﬁnds that relationship
lending is more likely when there is reduced banking market competition and ﬁrms hold a small number
of bank relationships.
24number of bank relationships are complements or substitutes. We run the regressions
with interactions with all three dummies, thus transforming our estimation model into a
piece-wise-linear regression, allowing the number of bank relationships to take a diﬀerent
coeﬃcient under diﬀerent market conditions.
The results are shown in the second group of columns of Table 5. When all ﬁrms are
considered, we observe that the negative impact of the number of bank relationships on
bank interest rates is deﬁnitely stronger in areas with more intense local bank competi-
tion: both the magnitude of the coeﬃcient and the t-statistics are increasing in the level
of market competition. This implies that, even though all ﬁrms seem to beneﬁtf r o m
having multiple lending relationships, the eﬀect becomes stronger when ﬁrms operate in
less concentrated credit markets. Taking into account diﬀerences in ﬁrm size, we observe
that this interaction between the number of relationships and the degree of competition
is always statistically signiﬁcant except once more for micro ﬁrms. All other ﬁrms ben-
eﬁt from holding multiple relationships in competitive settings. The results are more
signiﬁc a n tf o rl a r g e ra n do l d e rﬁrms, which should beneﬁt from more bargaining power
and suﬀer less from asymmetric information problems.
Our empirical ﬁndings show that there is some complementarity between market com-
petition and the number of bank relationships. Our results are generally consistent with
the predictions of Boot and Thakor (2000), who argue that informationally opaque ﬁrms
(micro and young ﬁr m si no u rs a m p l e )w h oa r em o r el i k e l yt ob ee n g a g e di nr e l a t i o n -
ship banking seem to beneﬁt less from price competition, and that market competition




For robustness purposes, we consider a diﬀerent measure of the number of bank rela-
tionships. We deﬁne Concentration in Lending (HHI) and construct it as a Herﬁndahl
Index of the value of loans from diﬀerent banks at the ﬁrm level in order to control for
the dispersion of borrowing, which is a feature not directly captured by Number of Bank
Relationships.35,36 Table 6 shows regression results with this alternative measure of the
number of bank relationships. Our earlier results are conﬁrmed by these regressions.
When Concentration in Lending (HHI) increases, the cost of borrowing increases. How-
ever, this result is statistically signiﬁcant only for large ﬁrms. If large ﬁrms concentrate
all their lending in one bank, they face higher borrowing costs than if they diversify. For
the remaining ﬁrms, what seems to matter most is the number of relationships, rather
than how loan amounts are distributed across those relationships.37. Each additional
relationship enhances the outside option of the ﬁrm, increasing its bargaining power.
This outside option exists as long as there is some relationship between a ﬁrm and a
bank, even if the amounts involved are not very large.
In Table 6 we also present the results of the interaction between Concentration in
Lending (HHI) and the local bank competition variables. We obtain signiﬁcant results
only for the large ﬁrms.
35This measure is similar, to some extent, to the weighted number of bank relationships.
36The importance of considering the concentration of lending relationships is discussed by Ongena,
Tumer-Alkan and Westernhagen (2007).
37Another potentially interesting way of measuring the importance of relationship lending would be to
consider the length of the relationship. However, given that there were several mergers and acquisitions
in the Portuguese banking system during the sample period, the use of this variable could entail some
caveats.
26Also for robustness purposes, we consider several diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First, we
try diﬀerent measures of aggregate bank competition including measures related to com-
petition from foreign banks operating in Portugal. Second, we test if lending from state-
owned banks inﬂuences borrowing costs. Third, we consider the maturity structure of
ﬁrms’ debt (short versus long term). Fourth, we control for ﬁrms with exports, both
inside and outside the European Union. None of these variables appear to be statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and our previous results remain unchanged. Finally, we test the eﬀect
of having one versus multiple relationships, by considering a binary variable which takes
the value of one when the ﬁrm has multiple relationships. This variable does not have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact on interest rates.
In addition, we also test the inﬂuence of having access to other funding sources, such
as trade credit or bond issuance, which can also be considered as alternative outside
options. We observe that when the proportion of non-bank debt is greater, the interest
rate on bank loans becomes lower, other things controlled for. This result suggests
that ﬁrms with access to non-bank funding sources may have more bargaining power in
negotiating loan pricing. Another possible explanation for this result is that banks may
ﬁnd these ﬁr m sl e s sr i s k y .T h i sr e s u l ti ss t r o n g e rf o rt h es m a l l e rﬁrms in the sample and
is signiﬁcant for both young and mature ﬁrms.
Another important issue is to verify if these results hold when we compute the number
of bank relationships using consolidated bank data. So far, we have been counting as a
bank relationship each relation a ﬁrm has with a diﬀerent bank, regardless of the bank
being part of a banking group or not. This choice implies that we consider that ﬁnancial
institutions manage their relationships with customers at the bank level and not at the
bank group level. Nevertheless, banks within the same group can share some customer
27information between themselves, thus aﬀecting interest rates and other loan conditions.
In order to be sure that our results are not aﬀected by this choice, we performed the
same estimations but counting the number of relationships as the number of relations
with diﬀerent banking groups. For 80 per cent of the ﬁrms in the sample, the number
of bank relationships does not change under this speciﬁcation. Overall, there is a slight
decrease in the average number of bank relationships, from 3.1 to 2.9. The regression
results remain broadly unchanged. The only diﬀerences worth noticing are that the eﬀect
of the number of relationships on interest rates is now slightly weaker for larger ﬁrms,
whereas the eﬀect becomes stronger for older ﬁrms.
Finally, we also test for the possibility of non-linear eﬀects of the number of bank
relationships on interest rates. Even though the addition of the squared number of bank
relationships to the regressions does not change the results, the variable ln(Number of
Bank Relationships+1) is signiﬁcant and has a negative coeﬃcient, as reported in the last
column of Table 6, thereby giving some support to the possibility of non-linear eﬀects
on interest rates. Thus, the decrease in interest rates obtained with additional bank
relationships should be more signiﬁcant for ﬁrms with a small number of relationships.
6.2 Endogeneity
The number of bank relationships nr
i is mainly a ﬁrm’s choice. However, we think it is
likely that nr
i is determined before the bargaining with the bank occurs and therefore it is
reasonable to assume nr
i as a predetermined variable in the estimation38. More precisely,
as stressed in Section 2, we assume interest payments are subsequent to initiating the
relationship with the bank.
38In the appendix we show the maximization problem ﬁrm i solves to choose nr
i.
28It may also be argued that the ﬁrm control variables and the cost of borrowing may
both be aﬀected by some ﬁrm-speciﬁc omitted variables that change over time (a classic
example is managerial ability). In addition, our interest rate measure possibly contains
interest payments on past loans, making it potentially simultaneously determined with
past balance sheet data. In this section, we address those issues by using data on
managers instead of balance sheet data.
Firm’s characteristics and the interest rate oﬀered by banks may be simultaneously
aﬀected by the capabilities of the ﬁrm managers. On one hand, a good ﬁrm manager
is capable of ensuring the successful operation of the business. On the other hand, this
manager is also likely to have good negotiation skills and obtain a lower cost of borrowing
from banks. In order to explore this possibility, we use another large micro dataset,
Quadros de Pessoal39. This dataset is based on an annual mandatory survey conducted
by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. It gathers information on virtually all ﬁrms
which have remunerated employees. From this dataset we collect information on all owner
and manager characteristics which could proxy managerial ability, such as manager age,
years of experience in the ﬁrm, gender, education level, and total remuneration (though
there is no information regarding the remuneration of ﬁrm owners). We merge this
dataset with the other two datasets used herein, the Central Credit Register and the
Central Balance Sheet Database.
In Table 7 we present the results of using manager’s characteristics as regressors,
instead of the balance sheet data. We run the regressions for the full sample, and also by
year. The education level attained by managers is the most signiﬁcant regressor: ﬁrms
with more educated managers beneﬁt from lower bank interest rates. Furthermore, the
39For details, please see the data appendix.
29coeﬃcient on nr
i remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant during most of the sample
period. This suggests that our earlier results were not aﬀected by endogeneity problems
arising from balance sheet information.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper studies the linkages between the number of bank relationships, bank compe-
tition and the cost of loans in a credit market with reduced information asymmetries.
The low information asymmetries arise from the existence of a public mandatory credit
registry designed to facilitate information sharing.
We construct a model to analyze how interest rates are set in an imperfectly compet-
itive banking market, when ﬁrms can engage in multiple bank relationships. The cost
of funding is determined by a bargaining game between the bank and the ﬁrm. The
number of lending relationships held by the ﬁrm inﬂuences positively the outcome of the
negotiation process. The model also shows that a change in the degree of competition
can increase or lessen the impact of the number of bank relationships on the cost of
loans. The outcome depends on the degree of complementarity between the number of
bank relationships and the tightness of the credit market.
There are several empirical studies that evaluate the impact of relationship lending on
ﬁrms’ borrowing costs. This paper makes an additional contribution to this literature by
investigating the extent to which the intensity of bank competition aﬀects the interaction
between the number of bank relationships and loan interest rates.
We begin the empirical analysis by looking at the eﬀect of the number of banks a
ﬁrm borrows from on the cost of bank loans. The results obtained suggest that ﬁrms
pay signiﬁcantly lower interest rates if they increase the number of lenders. When a ﬁrm
30has one additional bank relationship, the interest rate on bank loans drops by 9 to 20
bps on average, except for micro and young ﬁrms. This magnitude is both economically
and statistically signiﬁcant.
We then extend our analysis to explore how the intensity of bank competition aﬀects
the impact of the number of bank relationships on interest rates. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms
operating in environments with more intense bank competition beneﬁtm o r ef r o md i v e r -
sifying their lenders than do the remaining ﬁrms. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant for all ﬁrms
except for micro and young ﬁrms.
The diﬀerence in results between micro and young ﬁrms and the rest of the sam-
ple could be due to several factors, such as higher risks and persisting informational
opaqueness despite the existence of an information sharing mechanism. Moreover, for
micro ﬁrms the threat of the outside option might be less credible, resulting in a lower
bargaining power. Therefore, the most informationally opaque ﬁrms may still have to
rely on concentrated lending relationships, thus being less likely to beneﬁtf r o ml o w e r
interest rates brought by stronger competition.
Overall our results suggest that ﬁrms may improve their lending conditions when
they borrow from several banks at the same time, resulting in improved bargaining
power in the loan market. This eﬀect becomes stronger when banks operate in a more
competitive environment. Bank competition appears to play an important role in ﬁrms’
funding conditions and ultimately on the economy’s aggregate investment and eﬃciency.
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Implicit bank interest rate - mean
Implicit bank interest rate - median
Implicit  bank interest rate - weighted average
Aggregate interest rate
Notes: The aggregate interest rate is the interest rate on outstanding amounts of loans to non-financial corporations disclosed by Banco de Portugal in its 
Monetary and Financial Statistics. This interest rate is a weighted average of interest rates reported by banks. Implicit interest rates were computed using data 
from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. 
This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year.
 
 Implicit bank interest rate
Figure 2
Note: Empirical distribution of the implicit interest rate on bank loans,
computed as interest paid to banks as a percentage of total debt to credit




























































































Number of bank relationships
Implicit spread on bank loans (median) - rhs
Notes:  The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes 
detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on 
bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The implicit spread on banks loans was defined as the 
difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month Euribor). The number of relationships was computed using 
information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, which includes data on all loans granted in Portugal above 50 euros. The number of 




Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
1 10,880 9.4 8.4 14.3 10 20 8
2 10,497 9.0 7.9 16.4 12 33 13
3 7,361 8.6 7.5 18.8 15 49 21
4 4,938 8.4 7.1 21.4 17 72 31
5 3,172 8.2 7.0 22.4 18 100 41
6 1,999 7.9 6.7 24.2 19 134 60
7 1,318 7.8 6.6 25.2 20.5 168 75
8 739 8.2 7.0 26.9 22.5 209 97
9 466 7.9 6.9 29.0 23 244 120
10 284 8.5 7.2 32.6 27 302 151
11 164 9.1 7.5 33.8 29 329 194
12 76 7.7 6.8 30.4 25 873 215
13 66 8.7 7.4 36.3 28.5 788 290
14 29 9.3 8.3 34.4 27 676 470
15 25 9.1 9.9 49.2 47 1143 828
Total 42,263 8.8 18.6 66
Notes: The interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a
percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships
was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of
each year. To ease the reading of the table we exclude firms with more than 15 relationships.
Table 1
Age Employees
Implicit bank interest 
rates
Number of bank 
relationships
 Mean Median Mean Median diff t-ratio
Pr( |T| > 
|t| )
Micro 12417 1.8 2.0 9.6 8.7 9.9 9.4 0.44 5.44 0.00
Small 18703 2.8 2.0 8.9 7.8 9.0 8.7 0.29 3.92 0.00
Medium 8918 4.4 2.0 7.8 6.6 7.9 7.8 0.04 0.43 0.67
Large 2225 6.2 6.0 7.3 6.2 6.9 8.1 -1.17 -5.54 0.00
Total 42263 3.1 2.0 8.8 7.7 9.5 8.2 1.27 22.44 0.00
Table 2
Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed
accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a
percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central
Register of Banco de Portugal. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at
the end of each year. The definition of firm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into
account the number of employees and sales volume. More precisely, micro firms are defined as those with less than 10 employees and less than 2 million
euro of business volume; small firms are those with less than 50 employees and less than 10 million euro of business volume; medium firms are those with
less than 250 employees and a business volume below 50 million euro. All remaining firms are considered to be large firms. 
Mean comparison tests
Number of relationships and interest rates by firm size
Average 
interest rate 




for firms with 
many relations
Mean comparison test        
Ho: diff = 0
Firms with few relations were defined as those included in the first quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships. In turn, firms with many 
relations were considered to be those in the fourth quartile of the same distribution.
Number of bank 
relationships






 N Mean Std dev min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max skewness kurtosis
Implicit bank interest rate 42263 8.8 4.4 2.1 3.4 5.4 7.7 11.4 17.9 21.2 0.9 2.9
Number of bank relationships 42263 3.1 2.2 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 7.0 26.0 1.8 8.9
Turnover 42234 138.0 130.8 0.0 18.8 71.7 114.2 167.7 319.2 3343 6.2 80.6
Tangible assets as a % of debt 42241 53.0 122.2 0.0 1.5 13.4 36.1 69.4 143.5 14923 65.4 6867.2
Leverage 42234 78.4 133.5 1.1 39.6 62.5 75.3 87.5 112.9 21565 134.5 19953.7
Credit risk 42053 0.04 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.8 23.6
Debt coverage 42263 49.6 5727.3 -670093 -70.1 -0.2 4.1 18.6 119.5 818021 41.0 14880.4
Firm age 42160 18.6 16.4 0.0 3.0 8.0 14.0 23.0 52.0 248.0 2.4 11.4
Table 3
Summary statistics for explanatory variables
Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which
includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of
interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of bank relationships
was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and
services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of bank relationships
 t -0.142 -0.110 -0.091 -0.241 -0.154 -0.119 -0.206 -0.111 -0.126
-5.51 -2.79 -2.31 -1.24 -2.11 -1.80 -2.06 -1.36 -2.68
Turnover t-1 - -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
- -4.57 -4.16 -2.56 -1.99 0.61 -0.75 -3.83 -3.10
Tangible assets as % of debt  t-1 - -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005
- -2.60 -2.72 0.00 -2.16 -1.96 -0.20 -1.53 -1.57
Leverage t-1 - 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.014 0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.009
- 0.73 0.75 -0.57 1.71 0.65 -0.14 0.21 1.23
Credit risk t-1 - 0.446 0.461 0.428 0.881 0.053 0.104 0.310 0.551
- 2.01 2.05 0.69 2.25 0.14 0.19 0.77 1.95
Debt coverage t-1 - -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.006
- -1.79 -1.64 -0.67 -1.06 -1.98 -0.75 0.21 -3.00
Firm age t-1 - 0.455 -1.809 0.894 -0.211 1.210 2.543 - -
- 1.04 -5.01 0.67 -0.32 1.23 1.16 - -
Assets t - -6.107 -5.098 - - - - -5.382 -10.043
- -3.70 -3.08 - - - - -2.04 -3.87
Assets
2
t - 0.151 0.105 - - - - 0.132 0.274
- 2.73 1.89 - - - - 1.44 3.23
3-month Euribor t - - 0.582 - - - - - -
- - 9.69 - - - - - -
Number of banks t - - - 0 . 0 3 0 ---- - -
- - - 7 . 7 9 ---- - -
GDP growth t - - - 0 . 0 1 8 ---- - -
- - - 0 . 6 8 ---- - -
Constant 13.764 67.461 69.506 12.551 12.824 7.637 4.441 62.108 99.928
116.22 5.54 5.67 4.05 6.65 2.49 0.68 3.28 5.06
Number of observations 38764 16804 16804 3780 7836 4204 984 7584 9220
Number of firms 16014 7700 7700 2174 3822 1875 435 4043 4115
R
2 within 0.268 0.198 0.178 0.121 0.195 0.231 0.171 0.170 0.212
R
2 between 0.265 0.211 0.154 0.072 0.199 0.176 0.045 0.182 0.196
R
2 overall 0.259 0.185 0.132 0.073 0.188 0.166 0.030 0.167 0.165
Table 4 - Regression results
Fixed-effect regressions - controlling for firm characteristics
All firms
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database, which includes
detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a
percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of bank relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of
Banco de Portugal, by counting the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and services over
assets. Leverage is defined as debt over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net
profits over debt to credit institutions. Firm age defined as log(age+1). The definition of firm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May
2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number of employees and sales volume. Young firms defined as those created within the last 14 years and mature firms























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of bank relationships t -0.108 -0.246 -0.149 -0.122 -0.187 - - - - - - -
-2.76 -1.26 -2.04 -1.86 -1.85 - - - - - - -
Higher local bank competition t -0.046 0.190 -0.265 0.027 -0.556 - - - - - - -
- 0 . 5 1 0 . 7 1 - 1 . 8 6 0 . 1 7 - 1 . 7 4 -------
Lower local bank competition t 0.087 -0.226 0.159 0.284 0.104 - - - - - - -
0 . 9 4 - 0 . 8 3 1 . 1 1 1 . 6 7 0 . 2 8 -------
Number of relations * Higher competition t - - - - - -0.122 -0.116 -0.204 -0.135 -0.225 -0.118 -0.148
- - - - - -2.92 -0.52 -2.55 -1.95 -2.18 -1.32 -3.01
Number of relations * Medium competition t - - - - - -0.111 -0.260 -0.141 -0.135 -0.191 -0.119 -0.127
- - - - - -2.78 -1.33 -1.93 -1.99 -1.89 -1.45 -2.64
Number of relations * Lower competition t - - - - - -0.084 -0.329 -0.114 -0.080 -0.156 -0.065 -0.091
- - - - - -2.02 -1.56 -1.43 -1.18 -1.46 -0.75 -1.83
Turnover t-1 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006
-4.56 -2.59 -1.99 0.63 -0.77 -4.56 -2.60 -1.99 0.65 -0.75 -3.85 -3.09
Tangible assets as % of debt  t-1 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005
-2.58 -0.02 -2.10 -1.86 -0.19 -2.59 -0.01 -2.13 -1.89 -0.29 -1.49 -1.59
Leverage t-1 0.004 -0.005 0.015 0.007 -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.014 0.007 -0.006 0.002 0.008
0.74 -0.55 1.78 0.67 -0.13 0.73 -0.55 1.73 0.68 -0.23 0.23 1.20
Credit risk t-1 0.449 0.438 0.892 0.056 0.017 0.450 0.449 0.888 0.053 0.078 0.328 0.553
2.03 0.71 2.28 0.14 0.03 2.03 0.72 2.26 0.14 0.14 0.81 1.95
Debt coverage t-1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 -0.006
-1.79 -0.65 -1.03 -1.95 -0.68 -1.79 -0.63 -1.04 -1.97 -0.74 0.22 -3.02
Firm age t-1 0.450 0.858 -0.199 1.195 1.987 0.444 0.890 -0.225 1.206 2.218 - -
1.03 0.64 -0.31 1.22 0.90 1.01 0.67 -0.34 1.23 1.01 - -
Assets t -6.115 - - - - -6.080 - - - - -5.317 -10.021
-3.71 - - - - -3.68 - - - - -2.01 -3.85
Assets
2
t 0.152 - - - - 0.151 - - - - 0.130 0.273
2.74 - - - - 2.72 - - - - 1.41 3.21
Constant 67.485 12.670 12.747 7.590 6.078 67.266 12.579 12.822 7.623 5.552 61.645 99.696
5.54 4.07 6.64 2.48 0.91 5.51 4.07 6.68 2.49 0.83 3.25 5.03
Number of observations 16804 3780 7836 4204 984 16804 3780 7836 4204 984 7584 9220
Number of firms 7700 2174 3822 1875 435 7700 2174 3822 1875 435 4043 4115
R
2 within 0.199 0.122 0.197 0.233 0.178 0.199 0.123 0.196 0.233 0.175 0.170 0.213
R
2 between 0.211 0.073 0.196 0.177 0.055 0.211 0.071 0.197 0.176 0.052 0.182 0.197
R
2 overall 0.185 0.074 0.186 0.167 0.040 0.185 0.073 0.186 0.167 0.037 0.168 0.166
Dependent variable: Implicit bank interest rate
Table 5 - Local bank competition
Dependent variable: Implicit bank interest rate
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database. This interest rate was computed as
the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined
as debt over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. Firm
age defined as log(age+1). The definition of firm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number of
employees and sales volume. Local bank competition defined as the HHI of the banks granting loans to micro, small and medium firms at each district. When the HHI is in the 1st quartile
of each year distribution, we consider that there is higher local bank competition and when the HHI is in the 4th quartile we consider that there is lower l o c a lb a n kc o m p e t i t i o n .Y o u n g
firms defined as those created within the last 14 years and mature firms defined as those with more than 14 years. All regressions were estimated using year dummies and firm-fixed effects.























(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Concentration in lending (HHI) t 0 . 4 3 3 1 . 0 3 6 0 . 5 7 9 0 . 3 4 6 4 . 5 1 2 0 . 6 2 1 0 . 4 2 4 ----- -
1.47 1.26 1.34 0.59 3.17 1.25 1.08 - - - - - -
Concentration in lending * Higher competition t - - - - - - - 0.386 1.231 0.212 0.305 3.172 -
- - - - - - - 1 . 2 31 . 4 20 . 4 50 . 4 81 . 9 8 -
Concentration in lending * Medium competition t - - - - - - - 0.410 1.035 0.590 0.256 5.017 -
- - - - - - - 1 . 3 61 . 2 61 . 3 30 . 4 33 . 2 9 -
Concentration in lending * Lower competition t - - - - - - - 0.540 0.799 0.922 0.799 4.689 -
- - - - - - - 1 . 6 90 . 9 21 . 9 91 . 2 23 . 1 1 -
Ln(number of bank relations+1) t ---- --- ----- - 0 . 3 9 4
--- - --- ----- - 1 . 9 3
Turnover t-1 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.006
-4.51 -2.53 -1.93 0.68 -0.70 -3.83 -3.02 -4.51 -2.55 -1.92 0.70 -0.70 -4.56
Tangible assets as % of debt  t-1 -0.007 0.000 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007
-2.62 0.00 -2.16 -1.96 -0.59 -1.53 -1.59 -2.59 0.00 -2.10 -1.85 -0.42 -2.60
Leverage t-1 0.003 -0.006 0.014 0.006 -0.017 0.001 0.008 0.003 -0.006 0.014 0.006 -0.013 0.004
0.65 -0.61 1.66 0.55 -0.62 0.15 1.15 0.66 -0.60 1.72 0.57 -0.47 0.71
Credit risk t-1 0.442 0.377 0.885 0.060 0.029 0.301 0.544 0.445 0.383 0.907 0.068 -0.025 0.448
1.99 0.61 2.26 0.15 0.05 0.74 1.92 2.00 0.62 2.32 0.17 -0.05 2.02
Debt coverage t-1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003
-1.76 -0.67 -1.01 -1.96 -1.12 0.23 -2.95 -1.76 -0.66 -0.99 -1.93 -0.92 -1.78
Firm age t-1 0 . 3 7 3 0 . 8 3 3 - 0 . 2 6 5 1 . 1 2 6 2 . 3 3 8 -- ----- -
0.85 0.63 -0.40 1.15 1.09 - - - - - - - -
Assets t -6.109 - - - - -5.205 -10.146 -6.118 - - - - -6.052
-3.70 - - - - -1.97 -3.91 -3.70 - - - - -3.67
Assets
2
t 0.149 - - - - 0.125 0.275 0.150 - - - - 0.149
2.70 - - - - 1.36 3.24 2.70 - - - - 2.68
Constant 67.452 11.444 12.157 7.181 2.928 60.439 100.445 67.490 11.535 12.051 7.164 4.187 67.499
5.52 3.65 6.32 2.36 0.45 3.18 5.08 5.52 3.68 6.29 2.37 0.63 5.54
Number of observations 16804 3780 7836 4204 984 7584 9220 16804 9220 9220 9220 9220 16804
Number of firms 7700 2174 3822 1875 435 4043 4115 7700 4115 4115 4115 4115 7700
R
2 within 0.198 0.121 0.194 0.230 0.189 0.170 0.211 0.198 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.198
R
2 between 0.213 0.072 0.197 0.180 0.044 0.182 0.200 0.213 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.211
R
2 overall 0.187 0.073 0.186 0.168 0.039 0.167 0.169 0.187 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.185
All firms
Table 6 - Robustness tests
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database, which includes detailed accounting
information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at
the end of the year. Concentration in lending is an Herfindahl index using bank shares at the firm level. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt over
assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. Firm age defined as
log(age+1). The definition of firm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number of employees and sales
volume. Young firms defined as those created within the last 14 years and mature firms defined as those with more than 14 years. All regressions were estimated using year dummies.
Fixed-effect regressions - controlling for firm characteristics 
 
Dependent variable: Implicit bank interest rate
All years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of bank relationships t -0.153 -0.029 -0.057 -0.148 -0.156 -0.116 -0.112 -0.064 -0.038
-4.87 -0.92 -1.96 -4.57 -6.25 -4.50 -3.81 -2.07 -1.42
Managers age t -0.198 -0.458 -0.526 -0.424 -0.630 -1.010 -0.171 -0.831 -0.835
-0.52 -1.01 -1.30 -1.03 -1.75 -2.61 -0.46 -2.10 -2.03
Managers tenure t -0.005 0.214 -0.107 -0.146 -0.245 0.020 0.008 0.103 -0.021
-0.05 1.93 -1.07 -1.34 -2.53 0.21 0.09 1.10 -0.21
Managers education t -0.073 -0.216 -0.288 -0.264 -0.248 -0.231 -0.193 -0.269 -0.329
-1.64 -4.78 -6.99 -6.33 -7.29 -5.49 -5.11 -6.64 -7.70
Constant 14.948 15.599 15.243 13.389 12.454 13.484 9.100 10.624 10.740
10.31 9.33 10.25 8.79 9.45 9.28 6.52 6.91 6.83
Number of observations 27173 2568 3485 3550 4696 3213 3435 3250 2976
Number of firms 12622 ---- ----
F i r m - f i x e d  e f f e c t s YNNNN N N N N
R
2 within 0.298 ---- ----
R
2 between 0.276 ---- ----
R
2 overall 0.280 0.013 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.026
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central
Balance Sheet Database, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest 
rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of
the year. The number of bank relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, by
counting the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Manager characteristics refer
to firm owners and managers (there is no information for 2001). The regression for all years was estimated using year dummies
and firm-fixed effects.









We assume the following timing in the model: when the manager and the banker sit at
the bargaining table, the number of existing relationships nr
i is given. More precisely, the
ﬁrm chooses how many relations to have at t + τ,w h e r eτ ∈ [0,1], and the bargaining
occurs later in the period at t + τ0,w h e r eτ0 >τ . Therefore the choice of nr
i occurs






















































































where Et+τ is the mathematical expectation conditional on the information set up to
t+τ and C(nr
i) is a convex function of nr
i that represents the direct costs of initiating a






















































+ a2Et (Xi,t)+a3Yt + ui,t.
36The main equation we estimate in the paper is
r
L
i,t = b0 + b1n
r
i,t + b2Et (Xi,t)+b3Yt + εi,t.
As usual we assume that εi,t and ui,t are orthogonal. The potential endogeneity problem
is avoided because εi,t is in fact εi,t+τ
0,w h e r eτ0 >τand therefore orthogonal to the
information up to t + τ.
37Data Appendix
Filters were applied in order to guarantee a reasonable quality of the data used, even if at
the cost of a lower number of observations. The ﬁrst step was to exclude all observations
for which debt or interest paid was negative or equaled zero, given that it would not make
sense to compute implicit interest rates in such cases. We also excluded all ﬁrms that had
zero employees. Such ﬁrms should be mainly holding companies or ﬁrms in liquidation,
though this may also reﬂect isolated reporting problems in the database. Additionally,
we dropped all observations below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile of
the implicit interest rates distributions. Moreover, we dropped all observations for which
the estimated implicit interest rate was below the interbank money market interest rate.
Finally, we excluded all ﬁrms for which we did not have any information on the Credit
Register, given that it would be impossible to compute the number of bank relationships
for those ﬁrms. After applying all these ﬁlters to the implicit bank interest rate, we were
left with a database of 42,263 observations between 1996 and 2004.
In Section 6 we use an additional dataset, Quadros de Pessoal, to take into account
manager’s characteristics. All Portuguese ﬁrms with more than 10 employees must sub-
mit annually to the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity a report with information
on all ﬁrm establishments and their employees, referring to October.
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Mean Median Mean Median
Agriculture 1627 2.5 2.0 9.2 8.2
Commerce 12721 3.9 3.0 8.9 7.8
Construction 5526 4.2 3.0 8.9 7.8
Education 156 3.4 3.0 7.1 5.7
Fishing 155 2.8 2.0 8.7 7.5
Healthcare 156 4.0 3.0 7.3 6.4
Manufacturing 17145 4.4 4.0 8.9 7.8
Mining 505 4.6 4.0 8.4 7.1
Other public services 226 4.4 4.0 6.8 5.6
Real estate 1311 3.9 3.0 6.4 5.4
Tourism 638 3.0 2.0 7.8 6.6
Transports and communications 1900 4.3 3.0 9.2 8.1
Utilities 197 3.8 3.0 5.9 4.8
Total 42263 3.1 2.0 8.8 7.7
Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco
de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This
interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit
institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central
Register of Banco de Portugal. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks
which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year.
Number of bank 
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Table A
Number of relationships and interest rates by firm size
Implicit bank 
























Implicit bank interest rate 1
Number of bank relations -0.0907* 1
Turnover 0.0949* -0.1055* 1
Tangible assets as % debt -0.0516* -0.0029 -0.1898* 1
Leverage 0.0702* -0.1011* 0.0636* -0.4312* 1
Credit risk 0.0363* 0.0908* -0.0955* -0.0163 0.0944* 1
Debt coverage 0.0306* -0.0416* 0.1465* 0.0584* -0.2816* -0.0850* 1
Age -0.1073* 0.2603* -0.0849* 0.0843* -0.1702* 0.0164 -0.0156 1
Log assets -0.2894* 0.6268* -0.2309* 0.1399* -0.2340* 0.0532* 0.0273* 0.3197* 1
3-month Euribor 0.4840* -0.0149 0.0618* -0.0087 0.0502* 0.01 -0.0093 -0.0783* -0.1352* 1
Number of banks -0.4162* 0.0032 -0.0392* 0.0094 -0.0340* -0.005 0.0053 0.0596* 0.0978* -0.8241* 1
Table B -  Correlation matrix
Notes: An asterisk means that the pairwise correlation is significant at a 5 per cent level. Turnover represents sales and services over assets.
Leverage is defined as debt over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt
coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. 
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